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Given global demand for new infrastructure, governments face substantial challenges 
in funding new infrastructure and simultaneously delivering Value for Money (VfM). 
As part of the background to this challenge, a brief review is given of current practice 
in the selection of major public sector infrastructure in Australia, along with a review 
of the related literature concerning the Multi-Attribute Utility Approach (MAUA) and 
the effect of MAUA on the role of risk management in procurement selection. To 
contribute towards addressing the key weaknesses of MAUA, a new first-order 
procurement decision-making model is mentioned. A brief summary is also given of 
the research method and hypothesis used to test and develop the new procurement 
model and which uses competition as the dependent variable and as a proxy for VfM. 
The hypothesis is given as follows: When the actual procurement mode matches the 
theoretical/predicted procurement mode (informed by the new procurement model), 
then actual competition is expected to match optimum competition (based on actual 
prevailing capacity vis-à-vis the theoretical/predicted procurement mode) and subject 
to efficient tendering. The aim of this paper is to report on progress towards testing 
this hypothesis in terms of an analysis of two of the four data components in the 
hypothesis. That is, actual procurement and actual competition across 87 road and 
health major public sector projects in Australia. In conclusion, it is noted that the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has seen a significant increase in competition in public 
sector major road and health infrastructure and if any imperfections in procurement 
and/or tendering are discernible, then this would create the opportunity, through the 
deployment of economic principles embedded in the new procurement model and/or 
adjustments in tendering, to maintain some of this higher level, post-GFC, 
competition and throughout the next business cycle/upturn in demand including 
private sector demand. Finally, the paper previews the next steps in the research with 
regard to the collection and analysis of data concerning theoretical/predicted 
procurement and optimum competition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background and current practice in the selection of major public sector 
infrastructure 
Reflecting population growth, migration and demographic changes, the OECD (2006) 
estimates global demand for new infrastructure at USD 53 trillion between 2007-2030 
and in Australia, Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2010) has summarised 
estimates of required new infrastructure over the next 10 years from AUD 455 billion 
to more than AUD 770  billion (in 2007 terms).  This high demand for new 
infrastructure in many countries is presenting governments with severe challenges - 
not only in terms of funding in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) but at 
the same time, challenges in the delivery of new infrastructure whilst achieving Value 
for Money (VfM). One response to this challenge has been to leverage private finance 
as part of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). Such that now, PPPs are considered to be 
a key mode of delivering new infrastructure in many countries, including in the UK 
and in Australia (KPMG and Infrastructure Australia 2010). However, despite having 
led the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and having undertaken more PFI/PPPs than 
any other developed country, the latest report from the National Audit Office in the 
UK notes amongst its key findings that "There is no clear data to conclude whether the 
use of PFI has led to demonstrably better or worse value for money than other forms 
of procurement" (2011: 6). This uncertainty surrounding the relative merits of PPPs 
versus other/non-PPP procurement modes is being exacerbated, for example, and 
again in the UK, by the lack of transparency and accountability in non-PPPs (Thomas 
2011). 
In addition to a lack of comparative data (including a lack of data in operations), there 
also exists in the UK, uncertainty in terms of early identification of projects that are 
suitable for a PPP. Early identification of projects suitable for a PPP and as part of a 
preliminary evaluation is critical to avoid unnecessary expense of travelling too far 
down the PPP path including developing the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) as part 
of developing a PPP business case. Amongst the most authoritative observations, with 
regard to the early stages of project development and concerning the circumstances in 
which to select a PPP over other non-PPP modes, is given by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economics Affairs (2010: 31), albeit at a very broad level. That 
is, "the projects most suitable for private finance are those where the requirements can 
be clearly specified at the outset and which are of a size that consortia of private sector 
companies can take on their balance sheets". In other words, flexibility and 
competition are being identified as key determinants, or indicators, of the 
circumstances in which PPP maybe suitable and deliver VfM. 
In Australia, the National PPP Policy Framework seeks to enable public and private 
sectors to work together to improve public service delivery through private provision 
of public infrastructure and related services and requires jurisdictions to apply the 
framework to the procurement of PPP projects. The framework recognises that no one 
delivery method is presumed to be more efficient than another and in its Volume 1 
Procurement Options Analysis (POA) provides an approach for assessing the viability 
of PPP delivery against other procurement methods.  
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The approach in the POA comprises five steps: 
• Step 1: Data gathering (objectives; risks; unique project characteristics; agency 
and market capability); 
• Step 2: Shortlist delivery models (consider suitability of: PPP; Alliance; 
Managing Contractor; other); 
• Step 3: Validation (what precedent exists for the project? What does the 
market think?); 
• Step 4: Delivery model options analysis (which model best achieves 
requirements and objectives and reduces risk?); and 
• Step 5: Preferred delivery model (structure preferred model; consider risk; 
approval; gateway review). 
 
Step 2 uses four criteria, namely, scale, scope, whole-of-life opportunities and risk to 
begin to direct the procurement in one of three main directions. That is, PPP; or 
Project Alliance/Managing Contractor; or other. Step 4 envisages evaluating 
shortlisted procurement modes against project objectives and using data gathered in 
Step 1. The POA does not prescribe an evaluative method to be used in Step 4 but 
recognises that some departments in Australia have developed approaches (assessment 
matching, weighted tables and other tools) that reflect their particular project 
requirements and some of which are summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1: Australian state procurement guidelines  State Guidelines  
NSW Working with Government: Guidelines for Privately Financed Projects (December 
2006)/Value for Money drivers (Section 1.2) 
QLD Project Assurance Framework (July 2010) /PPP Policy and Value for Money Framework/ 
Business Case Development/Qualitative Assessment (Section 3.1.2.3)/ Value Drivers 
(Section 3.1.2.1) 
SA Procurement Policy Framework (May 2011)/Procurement Management Planning 
Guidelines (under development) 
VIC Investment Lifecycle Guidelines (July 2008)/Options Analysis/Procurement 
Options/Procurement Methods – comparison of strengths (Section 3.2) 
WA Infrastructure Procurement Options Guide (2010) 
On the one hand, evaluative methods in Step 4 of the National PPP Policy 
Framework’s POA and related state procurement guidelines in Table 1, do tend 
toward semi-quantitative (use of rankings/perceptual scales and non-monetary) 
measures of costs/benefits of alternative procurement modes and are supported by a 
large body of work generated by practitioners and academics in recent decades. In 
plain terms, these evaluative methods seek to systematically match client requirements 
(project outcomes) with the relative merits of alternative procurement modes, in order 
to select the preferred procurement mode and this approach is otherwise referred to as 
the Multi-Attribute Utility Approach (MAUA).  MAUA has been regarded as the “the 
foremost technique and approach for examining the criteria of clients and the 
preferences of experts’ weights for each method in the most objective way” (Love, 
Skitmore and Earl 1998). Indeed, Chang and Ive (2002) highlight the significance of 
MAUA, given that since the 1970s they note there to have been around 900 studies 
relating to procurement systems. On the other hand, Sweeney (2009: 61)  reviewed 
MAUA and identified some issues with implementing the approach and which 
includes the following: 
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• A lack of generally agreed and accepted set of criteria among the experts; 
• Difficulty in identifying enough skilled experts to reliably contribute to the 
scoring process; 
• Difficulty in reaching consensus in the set of utility scores for each 
procurement method; 
• The range of procurement methods in the research was not comprehensive;  
• The scores produced differ by narrow margins which results in limited 
differentiation and selection less reliable; and 
• The analyses were carried out on limited range of trial projects. 
 
These issues arise from a fundamental weakness in MAUA concerning its tautological 
nature and which is associated with the notion of matching client requirements 
(project outcomes) with the relative merits of alternative procurement modes in order 
to select the preferred procurement mode (Chang and Ive 2002; Teo, Bridge and 
Jefferies 2010). And most importantly, this weakness in MAUA creates a disconnect 
between the risk management plan and procurement selection that renders the 
approach susceptible to a non-economic influences and which makes the achievement 
of superior VfM in relative terms, an unlikely outcome. That is, in MAUA, the 
preferred procurement mode is being defined as a subset, or effectively in the same 
terms, as the desired outcomes from the project and is, therefore, tautological. A 
tautology is a statement of a relationship that is true by logic - as in Popper’s (1959) p-
q example. That is, if cause (read procurement mode) and effect (read outcomes from 
the project) are defined in the same terms, or if cause or effect are defined as a subset 
of each other, then the relationship is circular and considered a truism that is not 
falsifiable. In other words, MAUA lacks scientific maturity and amounts to a largely 
prescriptive approach that can be decoupled from the risk management plan - if 
deemed justifiable and for reasons other than an economic rationale.  
In one sense, however, there is nothing wrong with the role that MAUA can play, as 
indeed there is nothing inherently negative about tautologies. In fact, the acceptance of 
a tautology can be useful and the MAUA can be argued as a useful tool in justifying a 
particular procurement mode and in delivering VfM – albeit in terms of a more narrow 
definition of VfM. For example, take an extreme case in which a government agency 
is faced with satisfying a dominant or key project outcome visible at the opening day 
of the asset, say earliest time to complete construction and to the start of operations. 
Here, the government agency may proceed from this outcome (effect) upstream to the 
procurement mode (cause) that is selected on the basis of the suitability of this 
procurement mode’s relative merits - for illustrative purposes then, say Managing 
Contractor. The selected procurement mode may then proceed to deliver the desired 
key outcome but at the same time may deliver lower outcomes/benefits across the 
whole-of-life of the asset, than is achievable by other procurement modes - given the 
outcome/benefits trade-off that exists amongst different procurement modes. The 
selected procurement mode may well also represent an inferior approach to 
economising on the sum of production costs and transaction costs - given a lack of 
attention to production improvements resulting from incentive alignment across 
design; construction; and operations and maintenance, as well as costs arising from 
incomplete contracting (Chang and Ive, 2002). Despite this, as the procurement mode 
selected may succeed in terms of the required key performance outcome, then this 
should render the selected procurement a success - as all other benefits beyond the key 
performance outcome should be set at/near zero. Hence, accepting a tautology is 
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useful in this case, as the government agency responsible for delivery may be judged 
substantially on whether or not the procurement mode was successful in delivering the 
key outcome. That is, VfM in nominal terms instead of VfM in relative terms. 
Therefore, based on the above critique of MAUA and at least in the UK and Australia, 
there appears scope for improvements to be made concerning understanding the 
circumstances and projects that are best suited to a PPP or other non-PPP modes.  
New first-order procurement decision-making model 
Against this background and weaknesses of MAUA, a new first-order procurement 
decision-making model has been developed. This new procurement model is 
illustrated in Figure 1 and described elsewhere (Teo, Bridge and Jefferies 2010; Teo et 
al. 2011).  In order to facilitate procurement selection in pursuance of VfM in relative 
terms, the new procurement decision making model is based on falsifiable and a priori 
theory and which provides a clear connection between data gathering (including risks 
associated with project characteristics and in conjunction with the relative capability 
and competence of government versus private sector relative to the project) and the 
approach to procuring the project. More specifically, this new procurement decision 
making model deploys production cost and benefit theory from the field of strategic 
management and Nobel prize winning theory concerning transaction costs from the 
New Institutional Economics, in order to identify a procurement approach that 
represents an efficient configuration of risk allocation; bundle(s) of externalised 
activities; and the nature of the external exchange relationship with each externalised 
contract(s) for the project concerned. As such, the procurement mode informed by the 
new procurement model is more likely to deliver superior VfM, or a better ratio of 
production benefits to production costs and transaction costs across the whole-of-life 
of the asset, than procurement modes associated with the outcome of deploying 
MAUA.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic of new first-order procurement decision-making model (Source: Teo, 
Bridge and Jefferies 2010; Teo et al. 2011)  
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Testing and developing the new first-order procurement decision-making model 
As previously indicated, the House of Lords Select Committee on Economics Affairs 
(2010) consider competition to be a fundamental driver of value, in terms of 
recognising size as key determinant of the viability of a PPP. That is, size affects the 
number of willing suppliers or bidders and this effect is being greatly exaggerated in 
the current economic climate with constraints on credit. The absolute level of 
competitive tension will not only create downward pressure on prices but also 
facilitate the crystallisation of innovations that impinge on the time, cost and quality 
of the project and which will influence the overall performance of the project across 
its life cycle. More fundamentally, the extent to which actual observed competition in 
respect of a project matches the optimum competition for that project is an external 
indication and check of the likelihood that the actual procurement mode can deliver 
superior VfM in relative terms and in contrast to other competing procurement modes.  
As illustrated in Figure 2 and described elsewhere (Teo et al. 2011) competition is 
developed as a dependent variable/proxy for VfM and the corresponding hypothesis is 
given as: When the actual procurement mode matches the theoretical/predicted 
procurement mode (informed by the new procurement model), then actual competition 
is expected to match optimum competition (based on actual prevailing capacity vis-à-
vis the theoretical/predicted procurement mode) and subject to efficient tendering. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Procurement-tendering-competition hypothesis (Source: Teo et al. 2011)  
Also described elsewhere (Teo et al. 2011) the research method uses a combination of 
survey and case study methods designed to generate data to test the hypothesis 
illustrated in Figure 2 and, in doing so, develop and test the new procurement model. 
The aim of this paper is to report on progress towards testing this hypothesis, in terms 
of an analysis of two of the four data components in the hypothesis. That is, actual 
procurement (Box A) and actual competition (Box D) in road and health major public 
sector projects in Australia and which have been collected using a project information 
schedule - as a research instrument in a survey of government road and health 
departments and agencies in Australia. 
Box A 
Box B 
Box D 
Box C 
 
Actual Procurement 
Predicted Procurement 
New First-Order 
Decision Making Model 
(New integrated theory) 
 
Actual Competition 
 
 
Optimum  
Competition 
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ANALYSIS OF DATA CONCERNING ACTUAL PROCUREMENT 
AND ACTUAL COMPETITION  
Response and representative nature of data 
In total, 87 project information schedules were submitted, comprising 61 road and 26 
health-related projects across the five mainland states in Australia and with each 
project falling within the study’s parameters. That is, road and health projects with a 
capital value approximately in excess of AUD 50 million and in which expressions of 
interest had been established in the period July 2005 and June 2010. This response 
represented more than 50 percent of budgeted projects in both sectors (146 budgeted 
projects). On the basis of location, timing and size, and with the exception of health 
projects in Victoria, the sample is representative of budgeted projects and sufficient to 
generate reliable and distinct patterns relating to key aspects of the procurement 
decision and competition. 
Key procurement and competition patterns 
Project size/value 
The total value of the 87 projects is AUD 32.297 billion (comprising AUD 22.143 
billion road projects and AUD 10.154 billion health projects) and across these projects 
a low number of higher value projects account for an appreciably higher proportion of 
the value. That is, in roads 40 of the submitted road projects (66 percent) comprise the 
two lower value/most frequently occurring categories (between AUD 50 to 100 
million and AUD 100 to 250 million) and which account for AUD 4.164 billion (19 
percent) of the total value of the submitted road projects. At the same time, 10 of the 
submitted road projects (16 percent) fall in the two higher value categories (between  
AUD 500 million to AUD 1 billion, and more than AUD 1 billion) and which 
accounts for AUD 13.847 billion (63 percent) of the total value of the submitted road 
projects.  
In terms of health projects, 17 of submitted the health projects (65 percent) comprise 
the two lower value/most frequently occurring categories (between AUD 50 to100 
million and AUD 100 to 250 million) and which accounts for AUD 2.024 billion (20 
percent) of the total value of the submitted health projects. At the same time, five of 
the health projects  (19 percent) fall in the two higher value categories (between AUD 
500 million to $1 billion, and more than $1 billion) and which accounts for AUD 
6.593 billion (65 percent) of the total value of the submitted health projects.  
Actual procurement 
With regard to higher value road projects (greater than AUD 250 million), Alliance 
Contracting (in 7 projects) represented the most popular procurement approach. 
Whilst in terms of lower value road projects (approximately AUD 50 to 250 million), 
construct only and the design and construct approach (in 29 projects) was the most 
popular procurement mode. On the other hand, Managing Contractor in 13 projects 
(and of these projects most were greater than AUD 250 million) dominated the health 
projects submitted. 
Furthermore, there is an appreciable difference between road and health projects in 
terms of health projects with a much greater reliance on the contractor taking the 
contractual risk for the upper limit in the price (in 21, or 81 percent, of health projects 
representing AUD 9.407 billion, or 93 percent of the value of submitted health 
projects). In contrast, 33 or 54 percent of road projects (representing AUD 13.369 
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billion, or 60 percent of the value of submitted road projects) rely on the contractor 
taking the contractual risk for the upper limit in the price.  
However in common and across both road and health projects, only five projects 
include either the operation and/or maintenance (O&M) component(s) and which 
account for the minority of the value of the projects. 
Finally, the majority of road and health projects (62 projects, or 71 percent of the 
submitted projects representing AUD 19.406 billion, or 60 percent of the value of 
submitted projects) are delivered as a single contract and in terms of projects delivered 
as multiple contracts, these tend to comprise the two lower value categories and below 
AUD 250 million. As such, the procurement patterns noted in this section are not 
appreciably affected by the practice of multiple contracts. 
Actual competition 
For the purposes of this research, the attractiveness of the project as the measure of 
competition and in turn a proxy for VfM is measured using the number of firms 
demonstrating their willingness to bid either through open tendering or Expressions of 
Interest (EoI) by eligible contractors. Given the very small incidence of open 
tendering in the sample, the subsequent analysis in this section refers to EoI only but 
includes the number of firms submitting a bid via an open tendering process. Figure 3 
(that combines road and health projects) shows the number of EoI in each year, in 
terms of the line of best fit and which begins to slope upwards from 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Road and health EoI 
Whilst Figure 4 illustrates the aggregate EoI in both roads and health projects against 
the commencing date.  
In summary, combined EoI are statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
both in terms of the commencement date and including when this date is treated in 
two pre and post GFC categories. There also exists a significant relationship between 
EoI and procurement mode; between EoI and project value; and between EoI and 
payment terms. That is, greater EoI with construct only and design and construct 
procurement modes (statistically significant at the 99 percent confident level); greater 
EoI with lower project value (statistically significant at the 95 percent confident 
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level); and greater EoI for fixed price lump sum payment terms (statistically 
significant at the 99 percent confident level). Finally, there is a stark fall in EoI at 
around AUD 800 million. That is, there is a range of EoI between 2 to 15 contractors 
with a mean of 5.16 at project values less than AUD 800 million. For project values in 
excess of AUD 800 million the range of EoI is between 2 and 5 contractors with a 
mean of 3.86. 
 
Figure 4: Road and health EoI and commencing date 
CONCLUSIONS 
The key patterns in the sample and which are common to both road and health 
projects comprise: 
• A low number of higher value projects accounting for an appreciably higher 
proportion of the value. This pattern continues to exist when excluding PPPs 
from the sample, although this pattern becomes less pronounced;  
• A very low incidence of operations and/or maintenance being bundled-up with 
construction; and 
• A statistically significant increase in EoI post-GFC, along with a statistically 
significant relationship between EoI and procurement mode; capital value and 
payment terms. 
 
On the other hand, the key pattern in the sample representing a point of difference 
between the road and health projects concern a very strong tendency for the contractor 
to take the contractual risk for the upper limit in the price (and which corresponds 
with the dominance of the Managing Contractor approach) in the health projects. 
Whilst in the road projects, there is more of a balance in terms of government and the 
contractor taking the contractual risk for the upper limit in the price and this 
corresponds with construct only/design and construct and Alliance Contracting as the 
two most popular procurement modes in this sector. 
The GFC has seen a significant increase in competition in the public major 
infrastructure sectors in the paper and if any imperfections in procurement and/or 
tendering are discernible (to be investigated in subsequent steps in the research) then 
this would create the opportunity, through the deployment of economic principles 
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embedded in the new procurement model and/or through adjustments in tendering, to 
maintain some of this higher level, post-GFC, competition throughout the next 
business cycle/upturn in demand including private sector demand and therefore, 
advance construction capacity and competition and, in doing so, enhance VfM. 
Having surfaced the key patterns, the attention in this research project now turns 
towards the case studies in which to deploy the new first-order procurement decision 
making model and to generate the theoretical/predicted procurement in respect of each 
case (shown in Box B in Figure 2) and a nationwide survey of contractors to surface 
data concerning optimum EoI (shown in Box C in Figure 2). The approach being 
developed to select cases involves identifying cases that fall inside and outside the key 
patterns. This approach is designed to generate data to test and develop the new 
procurement model as fully as possible. The identification of the cases will remain 
confidential. 
The questions in nationwide survey of contractors are largely designed to map 
contractors' capability and actual prevailing capacity surrounding each selected case 
study project and vis-à-vis the theoretical/predicted procurement mode that emerges 
from deploying the new procurement model in each selected case study project. The 
theoretical/predicted procurement mode represents a particular and efficient 
configuration of risk allocation; bundle(s) of externalised activities; and the nature of 
the external exchange relationship with each externalised contract(s) for the case study 
project concerned. In doing so, it will also show the nature and extent of the most 
efficient construction package in the case study project. This can be used, in 
conjunction with data from the nationwide survey of contractors, to help estimate the 
optimum level of expected EoI that can then be compared with actual EoI in each of 
the selected case study projects - in pursuance of testing the hypothesis depicted in 
Figure 2. 
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